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Bipolar Possibility Theory
as a Basis for a Logic of Desires and Beliefs
Didier Dubois, Emiliano Lorini, and Henri Prade
IRIT-CNRS, Universite´ Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France
Abstract. Bipolar possibility theory relies on the use of four set functions. On
the one hand, a weak possibility and a strong necessity measure are increasing
set functions, which are respectively max-decomposable with respect to union
and min-decomposable with respect to intersection. On the other hand, strong
possibility and weak necessity measures are two decreasing set functions, which
are respectively min-decomposable with respect to union and max-decomposable
with respect to intersection. In the first part of the paper we advocate the use
of the last two functions for modeling a notion of graded desire. Moreover, we
show that the combination of weak possibility and strong possibility allows us
to model a notion of realistic desire, i.e., a desire that does not only account for
satisfactoriness but also for its epistemic possibility. In the second part of the
paper we show that possibility theory offers a semantic basis for developing a
modal logic of beliefs and desires.
1 Introduction
Possibility theory has been originally proposed as an alternative approach to probabil-
ity for modeling epistemic uncertainty, independently by two authors. In economics,
Shackle [26] advocated a new view of the idea of expectation in terms of degree of sur-
prise (a substitute for a degree of impossibility). Later in computer sciences, Zadeh [28]
introduced a setting for modeling the information originated from linguistic statements
in terms of fuzzy sets (understood as possibility distributions). Zadeh’s proposal for a
possibility theory relies on the idea of possibility measure, a max-decomposable set
function w.r.t. union with values in [0, 1]. However, in these works, the duality between
possibility and necessity (captured by a min-decomposable set function with respect to
intersection) was not exploited. Later, it has been recognized that two other set func-
tions, which contrast with the two previous ones by their decreasingness, also make
sense in this setting [10]. These two latter set functions, which are dual of each other,
model an idea of strong (guaranteed) possibility and of weak necessity respectively,
while the original possibility measure that evaluates the consistency between the con-
sidered event and the available information, corresponds to a weak potential possibility.
The framework of possibility theory with its four basic set functions exhibits a rich
structure of oppositions, which can be also closely related to other structures of oppo-
sitions that exist in modal logics and other settings such that formal concept analysis
for instance [11]. Moreover, possibility theory is graded since the four set functions can
take values in the unit interval. This very general setting can not only be interpreted in
terms of uncertainty. It makes sense for preference modeling as well [2]. But it is also
of interest when modeling situations that require modal logic languages, and where
grading modalities is meaningful. For instance, when modeling uncertainty, necessity
measures are useful for representing beliefs and their epistemic entrenchments [9].
We provide here an investigation of the potentials of possibility theory for modeling
the concept of desire. Indeed, although this concept has been already investigated in the
past in artificial intelligence [19,20],1 up to now, no clear connection between a theory
of desires and possibility theory has been built. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents a background on possibility theory. Section 3 discusses the
modeling of desires in terms of strong possibility, as well the dual notion of potential
desire in terms of weak necessity. We conclude by defining a notion of realistic desire,
in the sense of desiring something that one considers epistemically possible. In Section
4 we introduce a modal logic of beliefs and desires based on possibility theory, more
precisely, of realistic desires. The extension of this logic to graded desires is outlined.
Finally, Section 5 points out some lines for further research on the relationship between
possibility theory and the logic of emotions. A first version of sections 1-3 is in [22].
2 Background on Possibility Theory
Let pi be a mapping from a set of worlds W to [0, 1] that rank-orders them. Note that
this encompasses the particular case where pi reduces to the characteristic function of
a subset E ⊆ W . The possibility distribution pi may represent a plausibility ordering
(and E the available evidence) when modeling epistemic uncertainty, or a preference
ordering (E is then the subset of satisfactory worlds) when modeling preferences. Let
us recall the complete system of the 4 set functions underlying possibility theory [10]
and their characteristic properties:
– i) The (weak) possibility measure (or potential possibility)Π(A) = maxw∈A pi(w)
evaluates to what extent there is a world inA that is possible. When pi reduces to E,
Π(A) = 1 if A ∩ E 6= ∅, which expresses the consistency of the event A with E,
and Π(A) = 0 otherwise. Possibility measures are characterized by the following
decomposability property:Π(A ∪B) = max(Π(A), Π(B)).
– ii) The dual (strong or or actual) necessity measure N(A) = minw 6∈A 1− pi(w) =
1 − Π(A) evaluates to what extent it is certain (necessarily true) that all possible
worlds are in A. When pi reduces to E, N(A) = 1 if E ⊆ A, which expresses
that E entails event A (when E represents evidence), and N(A) = 0 otherwise.
The duality of N w. r. t. Π expresses that A is all the more certain as the oppo-
site event A is impossible. Necessity measures are characterized by the following
decomposability property:N(A ∩B) = min(N(A), N(B)).
– iii) The strong (or actual, or “guaranteed”) possibility measure∆(A)=minw∈A pi(w)
evaluates to what extent any value inA is possible. When pi reduces toE,∆(A) = 1
if A ⊆ E, and ∆(A) = 0 otherwise. Strong possibility measures are characterized
by the following property: ∆(A ∪B) = min(∆(A), ∆(B)).
1 For instance, in [19] Lang et al. propose a formal theory of desires based on Boutilier’s logic
QDT [4] in which two ordering relations representing preference and normality are given. The
interpretation given to the statement “in context ϕ, I desire ψ” is “the best among the most
normal ϕ ∧ ψ worlds are preferred to the most normal ϕ ∧ ¬ψ worlds” which is different
from interpretation of desire given in this paper.
– iv) The dual (weak) (or potential) necessity measure∇(A) = maxw 6∈A 1−pi(w) =
1 − ∆(A) evaluates to what extent there is a value outside A that is impossible.
When pi reduces toE,∇(A) = 1 ifA∪E 6= U , and∇(A) = 0 otherwise. Weak ne-
cessity measures are characterized by property:∇(A ∩B) = max(∇(A),∇(B)).
∆, ∇ are decreasing set functions, while the (weak) possibility and (strong) necessity
measures are increasing. A modal logic counterpart of these 4 modalities has been pro-
posed in the binary-valued case (things are possible or impossible) [7]. There is a close
link between Spohn functions and (weak) possibility / (strong) necessity measures [9].
3 Possibility Theory as Basis for a Logical Theory of Desires
The possibility and necessity operatorsΠ andN have a clear epistemic meaning both in
the frameworks of possibility theory, and of Spohn’s uncertainty theory [27] (also refer-
red to as ‘κ calculus’, or as ‘rank-based system’ and ‘qualitative probabilities’ [16]).
Differently from the operators Π and N , the operators ∆ and ∇ have not an intuitive
interpretation in terms of epistemic attitudes. Indeed, although ∆ and ∇ make sense
from the point of view of possibility theory and also from a logical viewpoint, it is not
fully clear which kind of mental attitudes these two operators aim at modeling. Here we
defend the idea that ∆ and∇ can be viewed as operators modeling motivational mental
attitudes such as goals or desires.2 In particular, we claim that ∆ can be used to model
the notion of desire, whereas∇ can be used to model the notion of potential desire. 3
According to the philosophical theory of motivation based on Hume [18], a desire
can be conceived as an agent’s motivational attitude which consists in an anticipatory
mental representation of a pleasant (or desirable) state of affairs (representational di-
mension of desires) that motivates the agent to achieve it (motivational dimension of
desires). In this perspective, the motivational dimension of an agent’s desire is real-
ized through its representational dimension. For example when an agent desires to be
at the Japanese restaurant eating sushi, he imagines himself eating sushi at the Japanese
restaurant and this representation gives him pleasure. This pleasant representation mo-
tivates him to go to the Japanese restaurant in order to eat sushi.
Intuitively speaking, with the term potential desire, we refer to a weaker form of
motivational attitude. We assume that an agent considers a given property ϕ potentially
desirable if ϕ does not conflict with the agent’s current desires. In this sense, ϕ is poten-
tially desirable if it is not incompatible with the agent’s current desires. Following ideas
presented in [21], let us explain why the operator ∆ is a good candidate for modeling
the concept of desire and why ∇ is a good candidate for modeling the idea of desire
compatibility. We define an agent’s mental state as a tuple M = (E,D) where:
– E ⊆W is a non-empty subset of the set of all worlds, and
– D ⊂W is a proper subset of the set of all worlds.
2 We use the term ‘motivational’ mental attitude (e.g., a desire, a goal or an intention) in order
to distinguish it from an ‘epistemic’ mental attitude such as knowledge or belief.
3 Here, the word potential does not refer to the idea that ϕ would be desired by the agent as
a consequence of his mental state, but the agent has not enough deductive power to become
aware of it. It is more the idea that the agent has no reason not to desire ϕ. Another possible
term is desire admissibility or desire compatibility.
The set E defines the set of worlds envisaged by the agent (i.e., the set of worlds that
the agent considers possible), whereas D is the set of desirable worlds for the agent.
Let M denote the set of all mental states. We here assume for every mental state M
there exists a world with a minimal degree of desirability 0 (this is why D 6= W ). This
type of normality constraint for guaranteed possibility distributions is usually assumed
in possibility theory. More generally, a graded mental state is a pairM = (pi, δ) where:
– pi : W → L is a normal possibility distribution over the set of all worlds, where
‘normal’ means that pi(w) = 1 for some w ∈ W , and
– δ :W → L is a function mapping every worldw to its desirability (or pleasantness)
degree in L, with δ(w) = 0 for some w ∈W .
– L is a bounded chain acting as a qualitative scale for possibility and desirability,
that make these notions commensurate.
Note that while δ(w) = 1 expresses complete desirability, δ(w) = 0 expresses indif-
ference, rather than repulsion. The condition δ(w) = 0 for some w ∈ W indicates that
desire presupposes that not everything is desired.
3.1 Modeling Desire Using ∆ Function
We here assume that in order to determine how much a proposition ϕ is desirable an
agent takes into consideration the worst situation in which ϕ is true. Thus, denoting by
||ϕ|| the set of situations where ϕ is true, for all graded mental states M=(pi, δ) and for
all propositions ϕ, we can interpret ∆(||ϕ||) =minu∈||ϕ||D(u) as the extent to which
the agent desires ϕ to be true. Let us justify the following two properties for desires:
∆(||ϕ ∨ ψ||) = min(∆(||ϕ||), ∆(||ψ||)) and ∆(||ϕ ∧ ψ||) ≥ max(∆(||ϕ||), ∆(||ψ||)).
According to the first property, an agent desires ϕ to be true with a given strength α
and desires ψ to be true with a given strength β if and only if the agent desires ϕ or ψ
to be true with strength equal to min(α, β). Notice that in the case of epistemic states,
this property would not make any sense because the plausibility of ϕ ∨ ψ should be
clearly at least equal to the maximum of the plausibilities of ϕ and ψ. For the notion of
desires, it seems intuitively satisfactory to have the opposite, namely the level of desire
of ϕ∨ψ should be at most equal to the minimum of the desire levels of ϕ and ψ. Indeed,
we only deal with here with “positive”4 desires (i.e., desires to reach something with
a given strength). Under this proviso, the level of desire of ϕ ∧ ψ cannot be less than
the maximum of the levels of desire of ϕ and ψ. According to the second property, the
joint occurrence of two desired events ϕ and ψ is more desirable than the occurrence
of one of the two events. This is the reason why in the right side of the equality we
have the max. The latter property does not make any sense in the case of epistemic
attitudes like beliefs, as the joint occurrence of two events ϕ and ψ is epistemically
less plausible than the occurrence of a single event. On the contrary it makes perfect
sense for motivational attitudes likes desires. By way of example, suppose Peter wishes
to go to the cinema in the evening with strength α (i.e., ∆(||goToCinema ||) = α)
4 The distinction between positive and negative desires is a classical one in psychology. Negative
desires correspond to state of affairs the agent wants to avoid with a given strength, and then
desires the opposite to be true. However, we do not develop this bipolar view here.
and, at the same time, he wishes to spend the evening with his girlfriend with strength
β (i.e., ∆(||stayWithGirlfriend ||) = β). Then, according to the preceding property,
Peter wishes to to go the cinema with his girlfriend with strength at least max{α, β}
(i.e., ∆(||goToCinema ∧ stayWithGirlfriend ||) ≥ max{α, β}). This is a reasonable
conclusion because the situation in which Peter achieves his two desires is (for Peter)
at least as pleasant as the situation in which he achieves only one desire. A similar in-
tuition can be found in [5] about the min-decomposability of disjunctive desires, where
however it is emphasized that it corresponds to a pessimistic view.
From the normality constraint of δ, we can deduce the following inference rule:
Proposition 1. For every M ∈M, if ∆(||ϕ||) > 0 then ∆(||¬ϕ||) = 0.
This means that if an agent desiresϕ to be true — i.e., with some strengthα > 0 — then
he does not desire ϕ to be false. In other words, an agent’s desires must be consistent.
Note that the operator∆ satisfies the following additional property:
Proposition 2. For every M ∈M, if ||ϕ|| = ∅ then ∆(||ϕ||) = 1.
i.e., in absence of actual situations whereϕ is true, the propertyϕ is desirable by default.
3.2 Modeling Potential Desire Using∇
As pointed out above, we claim that the operator ∇ allows us to capture a concept of
potential desire (or desire compatibility): ∇(||ϕ||) represents the extent to which an
agent considers ϕ a potentially desirable property or, alternatively, the extent to which
the property ϕ is not incompatible with the agent’s desires. An interesting situation is
when the property ϕ is maximally potentially desirable for the agent (i.e., ∇(||ϕ||) =
1). This is the same thing as saying that the agent does not desire ϕ to be false (i.e.,
∆(||¬ϕ||) = 0). Intuitively, this means that ϕ is totally potentially desirable in as much
as the level of desire for ¬ϕ is 0. In particular, given a graded mental state M = (pi, δ),
let D = {w ∈ W : δ(w) > 0} be the set of somewhat satisfactory or desirable worlds
in M . Then, we have∇(||ϕ||) = 1 if and only if D ∩ ||¬ϕ|| 6= ∅, i.e., ¬ϕ is consistent
with what is not desirable, represented by the set D.
Another interesting situation is when the property ϕ is maximally desirable for the
agent (i.e., ∆(||ϕ||) = 1). This is the same thing as saying that ¬ϕ is not at all poten-
tially desirable for the agent (i.e., ∇(||¬ϕ||) = 0). It is worth noting that if an agent
desires ϕ to be true, then ϕ should be maximally potentially desirable. This property is
expressed by the following valid inference rule which follows straightforwardly from
the previous one and from the definition of∇(||ϕ||) as 1−∆(||¬ϕ||):
Proposition 3. For every M , if ∆(||ϕ||) > 0 then∇(||ϕ||) = 1.
Let us now consider the case in which the agent does not desireϕ (i.e.,∆(||ϕ||) = 0).
In this case two different situations are possible: either ∆(||¬ϕ||) = 0 and ϕ is fully
compatible with the agent’s desires (i.e.,∇(||ϕ||) = 1), or ∆(||¬ϕ||) > 0 and then ϕ is
not fully compatible with the agent’s desires (i.e.,∇(||ϕ||) < 1).
3.3 Some Valid Inference Rules for Desires
The following is a valid inference rule for ∆-based logic, see [7,12] for the proof:
Proposition 4. For every M ∈ M, if ∆(||ϕ ∧ ψ||) ≥ α and ∆(||¬ϕ ∧ χ||) ≥ β then
∆(||ψ ∧ χ||) ≥ min(α, β).
Therefore, if we interpret∆ as a desire operator, we have that if an agent desires ϕ∧ψ
with strength at least α and desires ¬ϕ∧χ with strength at least β, then he desires ψ∧χ
with strength at least min(α, β). This seems a reasonable property of desires. By way
of example, suppose Peter desires to be in a situation in which he drinks red wine and
eats a pizza with strength at least α and, at the same time, he desires to be in a situation
in which he does not drink red wine and eats tiramisu´ as a dessert with strength at least
β. Then, it is reasonable to conclude that Peter desires to be in a situation in which he
eats both a pizza and tiramisu´ with strength at least min(α, β).
Another rule, never studied, mixes ∆ (alias actual desire) and ∇ (potential desire):
Proposition 5. For every M ∈ M, if ∆(||ϕ ∧ ψ||) ≥ α and ∇(||¬ϕ ∧ χ||) ≥ β then
∇(||ψ ∧ χ||) ≥ α ∗ β, where α ∗ β = α if α > 1− β and α ∗ β = 0 if 1− β ≥ α.
Proof. First, we have by duality ∆(||ϕ ∧ ψ||) ≥ α ⇔ ∇(||¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ||) ≤ 1− α. Then
observe ¬ϕ∧ χ ≡ (¬ϕ ∨¬ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ)∧ χ. Thus∇(||¬ϕ ∧ χ||) = max(∇(||¬ϕ ∨
¬ψ||),∇(||(¬ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ χ||)) ≥ β which leads to max(1 − α,∇(||ψ ∧ χ||)) ≥ β from
which the result follows. The last inequality is obtained by noticing that∇(||(¬ϕ∨ψ)∧
χ||) ≤ ∇(||ψ ∧ χ||) due to the decreasingness of ∇. It can be shown that α ∗ β is the
tightest lower bound that can be established for the above pattern. ⊓⊔
Thus, in particular, if ϕ is fully potentially desirable (∇(||ϕ||) = 1), and ¬ϕ ∧ ψ is
fully desirable (∆(||¬ϕ∧ψ||) = 1), then ψ is fully potentially desirable (∇(||ψ||) = 1).
The two above inference rules are the counterparts of the following inference rule:
if N(||ϕ ∨ ψ||) ≥ α and N(||¬ϕ ∨ χ||) ≥ β then N(||ψ ∨ χ||) ≥ min(α, β)
(the basic inference rule in standard possibilistic logic), and of the following one [8]:
if N(||ϕ ∨ ψ||) ≥ α and Π(||¬ϕ ∨ χ||) ≥ β then Π(||ψ ∨ χ||) ≥ α ∗ β
with α ∗ β = α if α > 1 − β and α ∗ β = 0 if 1 − β ≥ α. They are themselves the
graded counterparts of two inference rules well-known in modal logic [13,8].
3.4 Realistic Desires
Besides, ∆(||ϕ||) = α implies that for any ψ logically independent from ϕ, it holds
that ∆(||ϕ ∧ ψ||) ≥ α and ∆(||ϕ ∧ ¬ψ||) ≥ α, which may sound counterintuitive.
Indeed, suppose you wish to choose a menu and you prefer to eat fish than not to a
certain degree. It means that you should wish to eat fish with white wine, and fish with
red wine to a degree at least as high. Yet, you may dislike very much to drink red wine
with fish. Your desire for fish presupposes the restaurant offers white wine as well. So
you express your desire for fish is conditioned to the possibility of having white wine
as well. In other words, you believe that in fish restaurants it is more likely to find white
wine than red wine. Modeling desire irrespectively of what you assume to be possible
is liable to such kind of paradoxes when using the set-function δ.
This discussion suggests that a realistic desire can be defined as one whose real-
ization is considered possible by the agent. The most natural representation consists
in restricting crist mental states to pairs (E,D) such that E ∩ D 6= ∅, called realistic
mental states, the set of which is denoted byMr. Indeed, if E ∩D = ∅, then the agent
knows that desirable states are impossible in his view. Then the agent with mental state
(E,D) is said to realistically desire ϕ if and only if ∆(||ϕ||) = 1 (that is, ||ϕ|| ⊆ D)
and Π(||ϕ||) = 1 (that is, ||ϕ|| ∩ E 6= ∅).
A more conservative notion of realistic desire would consist in requestingN(||ϕ||) =
1 instead of Π(||ϕ||) = 1, that is realistic desire would concern only propositions ϕ
such that the agent is certain that ϕ is true. However one may question the fact that re-
alistically desiring ϕ to be true may presuppose no risk at all for ϕ being false, namely
the complete certainty that ϕ is true. This corresponds better to the idea of happiness.
On the contrary, the preceding the notion of realistic desire defined by∆(||ϕ||) = 1 and
Π(||ϕ||) = 1 corresponds to the notion of hope. Indeed, according to psychological the-
ories of emotion (e.g., [24]), while happiness is triggered by prospective consequences
(or prospects), hope is triggered by actual consequences. 5
In the case of graded mental states, (pi, δ), one may take a restritive point of view
on possible states of affairs, evaluating desired statements overs pairs (pi, δ) such that
E = {w : pi(w) = 1} ∩ {w : δ(w) > 0} 6= ∅. It comes down to working with pairs
(E, δ) where only desire is graded. Then desires are expressed under the assumption
that they can be achieved in at least one normal situation.
Alternatively one may compute the degree of realistic desire in the mental state (pi, δ)
as ρ(||ϕ||) = min(∆(||ϕ||), Π(||ϕ||)). It presupposes that degrees of plausibility and
degrees of desire are commensurate.
Note that the above proposal differs from the one that would restrict desired states
to possible ones, that is, replacing δ by δpi = min(δ, pi) since ρ(A) ≥ ∆pi(A) =
minw∈Amin(δ(w), pi(w)). For instance, if E ∩ D 6= ∅, A ∩ E 6= ∅, E ∩ A 6= ∅, and
A ⊆ D, then ρ(A) = 1 but ∆pi(A) = 0 since then δpi(w) = 0 for some w ∈ A.
4 Logics of Beliefs and Desires
In this section we introduce some variants of a modal logic of beliefs and desires, called
here BDL, based on the ideas presented in the previous sections. Specifically, the logics
presented here support reasoning about the notion of belief, as traditionally studied
in the area of modal logic of belief (alias doxastic logic) [23,14,17], in combination
with the notion of (∆-based) desire discussed in Section 3.1 and the notion of (∆-
based) realistic desire discussed in Section 3.4. We first consider a simpler logic, in
line with the previous sections, that, like MEL [1], does not support the nesting of
modalities and allows us to reason about purely (non-graded) notions of belief and
desire. The semantics will then be defined in terms of mental states (pairs of sets or
distributions). Then, we present a simple generalization of this logic that allows us to
formalize notions of graded belief and graded desire. Finally, we consider a full-fledged
modal logic of graded beliefs and graded desires with multiple agents that supports the
nesting of modalities. The nesting of modalities is crucial in order to represent an agent
i’s beliefs about the beliefs (or the desires) of a different agent j.
5 Like [15], we here interpret the term ‘prospect’ as synonymous of ‘uncertain consequence’ (in
contrast with ‘actual consequence’ as synonymous of ‘certain consequence’).
4.1 Minimal Modal Logic of Beliefs and Desires MBDL
Let us introduce a propositional language PL based on a countable set Prop of atomic
propositions (with typical members denoted p, q, . . .), and defined by the following
grammar: ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ, where p ranges over a given countable set of atomic
propositions Prop = {p, q, . . .}, some of which can be decision variables. The other
Boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined from p, ¬ and ∧ in the standard
way. A propositional valuation is defined in the standard way as a subset of atomic
propositions considered as true, the other ones being false. Propositional valuations,
also called worlds or states, are denoted by symbolsw. The set W is identified with the
set 2Prop of all propositional valuations. Let ||p||={w : p∈w} be the set of models of p.
The extension of propositional formulas is defined in the standard way as follows:
||¬ϕ|| =W \ ||ϕ||; ||ϕ ∧ ψ|| = ||ϕ|| ∩ ||ψ||
We first consider the Boolean case and the most elementary language that may cap-
ture the previously introduced notions. The language LN,∆ of the logic MBDL is de-
fined as follows: Φ ::= Nϕ | ∆ϕ | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Ψ , where formulas ϕ range over
PL. In other words, Nϕ and ∆ϕ are atomic propositions, respectively referring to the
statements “the agent believes that ϕ” and “the agent desires that ϕ”. The two modal
operatorsN and ∆ have the following intuitive readings:
– Nϕ means: the agent believes that ϕ is true (i.e., ϕ is true in all worlds that the
agent envisages as possible),
– ∆ϕ means: the agent considers ϕ desirable in all worlds where ϕ is true.
The dual operators Π and∇ are defined in the usual way as follows:
Πϕ
def
= ¬N¬ϕ; ∇ϕ
def
= ¬∆¬ϕ
The set of axioms of MBDL is given in Figure 2 and provides a proof system for
this logic MBDL. The first three modal axioms are those of KD, more specifically its
subjective fragment where modalities are not nested. They account for Boolean ne-
cessity measures. The three following ones for the desire modality are the translation
of the former when replacing necessity by guaranteed possibility, using the identity
N(A) = minw 6∈A 1− pi(w) = ∆(A) if δ = 1− pi.
All tautologies of propositional calculus (PC)
(Nϕ ∧N(ϕ→ ψ))→ Nψ (KN )
¬(Nϕ ∧N¬ϕ) (DN )
N⊤ (NN )
(∆ϕ ∧∆(¬ϕ ∧ ψ))→ ∆ψ (K∆)
¬(∆ϕ ∧∆¬ϕ) (D∆)
∆⊥ (N∆)
ϕ,ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(MP)
Fig. 1. Sound and complete axiomatization of MBDL
The truth of a MBDL formula is evaluated w. r. t. a valuation w and a mental state
M=(E,D) ∈ M, by means of the following rules:
M |= Nϕ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈ E,w ∈ ||ϕ||; M |= ∆ϕ⇐⇒ ∀w |= ϕ,w ∈ D
M |= ¬Φ⇐⇒M 6|= Φ; M |= Φ ∧ Ψ ⇐⇒M |= Φ AND M |= Ψ
We say that a formula Φ of the language LBDL(Prop) is valid, denoted by |=MBDL Φ, if
and only if for every mental state M in MM |= Φ. We say that Φ is satisfiable if and
only if ¬Φ is not valid. It can be checked that
– M |= Nϕ if and only if N(||ϕ||) = 1 with respect to E.
– M |= ∆ϕ if and only if ∆(||ϕ||) = 1 with respect to D.
In the logic MBDL we can also formally express the concept of realistic desire:
R∆ϕ
def
= ∆ϕ ∧ ¬N¬ϕ.
We can now prove the completeness theorem for this logic:
Theorem 1. The axioms and the rules of inference given in Figure 1 provides a sound
and complete axiomatization for the logic MBDL.
Proof (Sketch). Soundness is easy to obtain. As to completeness, note that axioms KN ,
DN , and NN imply the equivalence betweenN(ϕ∧ψ) andNϕ∧Nψ. Likewise, axioms
K∆, D∆, and N∆ imply the equivalence between ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) and ∆ϕ ∧∆ψ. Besides, a
propositional valuation v of the language of MBDL assigns 0 or 1 to each Nϕ and ∆ϕ.
Define two set functions ν and µ overW by letting ν(A) = 1 if and only if v(Nϕ) = 1
if A = ||ϕ|| and 0 otherwise; and likewise µ(A) = 1 if and only if v(∆ϕ) = 1 if
A = ||ϕ|| and 0 otherwise. Axioms of propositional logic ensures these definitions are
sound (truth assignments to Nϕ and ∆ϕ do not change if ϕ is replaced by a logically
equivalent proposition). Moreover the 6 first modal axioms imply that ν is a Boolean
necessity measure and µ a Boolean guaranteed possibility measure. It means that there
exists a mental state M = (Ev, Dv) such that v(Nϕ) = 1 if and only if Ev ⊆ ||ϕ|| and
v(∆ϕ) = 1 if and only if ||ϕ|| ⊆ Dv. Using the completeness of propositional logic,
we thus prove that, for any subset of formulas B in the logic MBDL:
B ⊢MBDL Φ ⇐⇒ B ∪ {KN , DN , NN , K∆, D∆, N∆} ⊢PL Φ
⇐⇒ (∀v, v |=PL B ∪ {KN , DN , NN , K∆, D∆, N∆} ⇒ v |=PL Φ
⇐⇒ ∀(E,D) ∈M, (E,D) |=MBDL B ⇒ (E,D) |=MBDL Φ ⇐⇒ B |=MBDL Φ
An interesting aspect of the modal logic MBDL is that one can make syntactic proofs
of some properties of the notions of (∆-based) desire. For instance, we can give the
following syntactic proof of the inference rule for desire given in Proposition 4 when
α = 1, namely {∆(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆(¬ϕ ∧ χ)} ⊢MBDL ∆(ψ ∧ χ):
1. ApplyingK∆ when ψ |= ϕ yields theorem T1:⊢MBDL ∆ϕ→ ∆ψ if ψ |= ϕ.
2. K∆ can be written as T2: if ϕ∧ψ is a contradiction,⊢MBDL ∆ϕ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ∨ψ).
3. Applying T2: {∆(ϕ ∧ ψ), ∆(¬ϕ ∧ χ)} ⊢MBDL ∆((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ χ))
4. By T1, {∆(ϕ∧ψ), ∆(¬ϕ∧χ)} ⊢MBDL ∆(ψ∧χ) since ψ∧χ |= (ϕ∧ψ)∨(¬ϕ∧χ)
4.2 Outline of a Minimal Modal Logic of Graded Beliefs and Desires MGBDL
Assume a finite chain L ⊆ [0, 1] containing the values 0 and 1 such that for every α ∈ L
we have 1 − α ∈ L. For every α ∈ L such that α > 0, let p(α) denote the number
β ∈ L such that β < α and there is no γ ∈ L such that β < γ < α. β is called the
predecessor of α in L. Furthermore, let p(0) = 0. For every α ∈ L such that α < 1,
let σ(α) denote the number β ∈ L such that α < β and there is no γ ∈ L such that
α < γ < β. β is called the successor of α in L. Furthermore, let σ(1) = 1.
The language LLN,∆ of the graded logic MGBDL is defined as follows:
Φ ::= N≥αϕ | ∆≥βϕ | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Ψ,
where formulas ϕ range over PL and α > 0, β > 0 ∈ L. In other words, N≥αϕ and
∆≥βϕ are atomic propositions, respectively encoding the statements:
– N≥αϕ means: the agent believes that ϕ is true to at least level α (i.e., ϕ is true in
all worlds that the agent envisages as possible at level at least σ(1 − α)),
– ∆≥βϕ: for the agent ϕ is desirable at least at level β in all worlds where ϕ is true.
The set of axioms of MGBDL are those of PL, the six first modal ones of Figure 1
for each N≥α and ∆≥β . Finally, we must add weakening axioms for the two graded
modalities:
[W∆] : ∆≥βϕ→ ∆≥p(β)ϕ [WN ] : N≥αϕ→ N≥p(α)ϕ.
The semantics is defined by means of graded mental states (pi, δ) as defined in
Section 3. A completeness theorem can be proved as for the Boolean case. Again
the idea is to interpret any propositional valuation v of the language LLN,∆ as a pair
of set functions (gvN , gv∆) on W stemming from a pair (pi, δ). Namely we can let
gvN(||ϕ||) = max{α : v(N
≥αϕ) = 1}, and gv∆(||ϕ||) = max{β : v(∆≥βϕ) = 1},
which is meaningful due to the weakening axioms, and prove that the other axioms
ensure that gvN is a necessity measure, and gv∆ is a guaranteed possibility measure.
4.3 Multi-agent Modal Logic of Graded Beliefs and Desires GBDLn
Let Agt = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents (or individuals). The language LLNi,∆i of
the logic GBDLn consists of a set of formulae and is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | N≥αi ϕ | ∆
≥β
i ϕ
where p ranges over the set of atomic propositions Prop, α, β ∈ L \ {0} and i ranges
over the set of agents Agt . The two modal operatorsN≥αi and ∆
≥β
i have the following
intuitive readings:
– N
≥α
i ϕ means: agent i believes that ϕ is true with strength at least α (i.e., ϕ is true
in all worlds that agent i considers possible at level at least σ(1− α)),
– ∆
≥β
i ϕ means: agent i desires ϕ with strength at least β (i.e., all worlds in which ϕ
is true are desirable for agent i at level at least β).
The interesting aspect of the logic GBDLn is that it allows to represent what a
given agent i believes about another j’s beliefs and desires. For instance, the formula
N
≥α1
1 N
≥α2
2 ϕ expresses that agent 1 believes with strength at least α1 that agent 2
believes ϕ with strength at least α2, whereas the formula N≥α11 ∆
≥β2
2 ϕ expresses that
agent 1 believes with strength at least α1 that agent 2 desires ϕwith strength at least β2.
The semantics of the logic GBDLn is defined in terms of multi-agent mental states
of the form M = (S, {pii,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , {δi,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , V ) where:
– S is a set of states, including states of the agents (possibly more general than W ) ;
– for all s ∈ S and for all i ∈ Agt , (pii,s, δi,s) is a graded mental state over the set S
as the one defined in Section 3;
– V : S −→ 2Prop is a valuation function for atomic propositions: p ∈ V (s) means
that proposition p is true at world w = V (s).
Specifically, pii,s(s′) captures how much, in state s, agent i thinks that state s′ is (epis-
temically) possible, while δi,s(s′) captures how much, in state s, agent i thinks that
state s is desirable. Note that parameterizing possibility distributions pii,s and δi,s with
states is one way to model an agent i’s uncertainty about the beliefs and the desires of
another agent j.
The truth of a GBDLn formula is evaluated with respect to a given state s in a multi-
agent mental state M = (S, {pii,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , {δi,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , V ) by means of the fol-
lowing rules:
M, s |= p⇐⇒ p ∈ V (s)
M, s |= ¬ϕ⇐⇒M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒M, s |= ϕ AND M, s |= ψ
M, s |= N≥αi ϕ⇐⇒ ∀s
′ ∈ S : IF pii,s(s
′) ≥ σ(1− α) THEN M, s |= ϕ
M, s |= ∆≥βi ϕ⇐⇒ ∀s
′ ∈ S : IF M, s |= ϕ THEN δi,s(s
′) ≥ β
We say that a formula ϕ of the logic GBDLn is valid, denoted by |=GBDLn ϕ, if and
only if for every multi-agent mental stateM = (S, {pii,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , {δi,s}i∈Agt,s∈S , V )
and for every state s in S, M, s |= ϕ. We say that ϕ is GBDLn satisfiable if and only
if ¬ϕ is not GBDLn valid. For instance, ¬N≥σ(0)1 ∆
≥σ(0)
2 p ∧ ¬N
≥σ(0)
1 ¬∆
≥σ(0)
2 p is a
satisfiable formula in the logic GBDLn. It means that agent 1 is uncertain whether agent
2 desires p or not.
In the logic GBDLn we can also formally express the concept of realistic desire for
a given agent i. For all all i ∈ Agt we define:
R∆
≥β
i ϕ
def
= ∆≥βi ϕ ∧ ¬N
≥1
i ¬ϕ
where R∆≥βi ϕ has to be read “agent i realistically desires ϕ with strength at least β”.
The above realistic desire operatorR∆≥βi exactly corresponds to the notion of realistic
desire discussed in Section 3.4. The general idea is that agent i realistically desires ϕ
with strength at least β (i.e., R∆≥βi ϕ) if and only if agent i desires ϕ with strength at
least β and is not completely certain that ϕ is false.
We can prove that the list of principles given in Figure 2 provides a proof system
for the logic GBDLn. In the axiomatization we use the following abbreviation for all
γ ∈ L \ {1}:

≤γ
i ϕ
def
= ∆
≥σ(γ)
i ¬ϕ
All tautologies of propositional calculus (PC)
(N≥αi ϕ ∧N
≥α
i (ϕ→ ψ))→ N
≥α
i ψ (KN≥α
i
)
¬(N≥αi ϕ ∧N
≥α
i ¬ϕ) (DN≥α
i
)
(≤γi ϕ ∧
≤γ
i (ϕ→ ψ))→ 
≤γ
i ψ (K≤γ
i
)
¬(≤0i ϕ ∧
≤0
i ¬ϕ) (D≤0
i
)
N
≥α
i ϕ→ N
≥p(α)
i ϕ (InclN≥α
i
,N
≥p(α)
i
)

≤γ
i ϕ→ 
≤p(γ)
i ϕ (Incl≤γ
i
,
≤p(γ)
i
)
ϕ,ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(MP)
ϕ
N
≥α
i ϕ
(Nec
N
≥α
i
)
ϕ

≤γ
i ϕ
(Nec

≤γ
i
)
Fig. 2. Sound and complete axiomatization of GBDLn
Theorem 2. The axioms and the rules of inference given in Figure 2 provides a sound
and complete axiomatization for the logic BDL.
Proof (Sketch). It is a routine task to verify that the axioms given in Figure 2 are
sound and that the rules of inference preserve validity. The proof of completeness
has 2 steps. Step 1 consists in proving that the semantics of the logic GBDLn given
above is equivalent to an alternative semantics in terms of Kripke models with acces-
sibility relations. Specifically, let us define the notion of Kripke GBDLn model as a
tuple M = (S, {Ti,≥α}i∈Agt,α∈L\{0}, {Ri,≤γ}i∈Agt,γ∈L\{1}, V ) where S and V are
as defined above, and every Ti,≥α and every Ri,≤γ are binary relations on S satisfy-
ing the constraints: (C1) Ti,≥1 is serial; (C2) Ri,≤0 is serial; (C3) forall α ∈ L \ {0},
Ti,≥σ(α) ⊆ Ti,≥α; (C4) for all γ ∈ L \ {1}, Ri,≤p(γ) ⊆ Ri,≤γ .
In this alternative Kripke semantics for GBDLn, the truth of a formula is evaluated
w. r. t. a state s in a Kripke GBDLn model M by means of the following rules:
M, s |= p⇐⇒ p ∈ V (s) ; M, s |= ¬ϕ⇐⇒M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒M, s |= ϕ AND M, s |= ψ
M, s |= N≥αi ϕ⇐⇒ ∀s
′ ∈ Ti,≥σ(1−α)(s) :M, s |= ϕ
M, s |= ∆≥βi ϕ⇐⇒ ∀s
′ ∈ Ri,≤p(β)(s) :M, s |= ¬ϕ
where Ti,≥σ(1−α)(s) = {s′ ∈ S | (s, s′) ∈ Ti,≥σ(1−α)} and Ri,≤p(β)(s) = {s ∈ S |
(s, s′) ∈ Ri,≤p(β)}. We say that a formula ϕ of the logic GBDLn is valid with respect
to the class of Kripke GBDLn models if and only if for every Kripke GBDLn modelM
and for every state s in S we have M, s |= ϕ.
Lemma 1. For every formula ϕ of the logic GBDLn, |=GBDLn ϕ if and only if ϕ is valid
with respect to the class of Kripke GBDLn models.
The 2nd step of the proof consists in showing that the list of principles given in Fig-
ure 2 completely axiomatizes the set of validities of the logic GBDLn whose language is
interpreted over Kripke GBDLn models. It is a routine task to check that the axioms in
Figure 2 correspond one-to-one to their semantic counterparts on GBDLn Kripke mod-
els. In particular, Axioms K
N
≥α
i
and K

≤γ
i
together with the rules of inference Nec
N
≥α
i
and Nec

≤γ
i
correspond to the fact that N≥αi and 
≤γ
i ϕ are normal modal operators
interpreted by means of accessibility relations. Axiom D
N
≥α
i
corresponds to the fact
that the relation Ti,≥1 is serial (Constraint C1), while Axiom D≤0
i
corresponds to the
fact that the relationRi,≤0 is serial (Constraint C2). Moreover, Axioms InclN≥αi ,N≥p(α)i
and Incl

≤γ
i
,
≤p(γ)
i
correspond respectively to the Constraints C3 and C4.
It is routine, too, to check that all principles given in Figure 2 are in the so-called
Sahlqvist class [25]. This means that they are complete with respect to the defined
model classes, cf. [3, Th. 2.42]. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusive Remarks: Towards Emotions
In the previous sections, we have shown that possibility theory offers a unified logical
framework in which both epistemic attitudes such as beliefs and motivational attitudes
such as desires can be modeled. As a perspective along this line, we may study how
the components of the approach, the epistemic one and the motivational one, can be
combined in order to model basic emotion types such as hope and fear. Similar ideas
on the logic of emotion intensity have been recently presented in [6] without making a
connection with possibility theory.
Besides, we have described two extreme approaches to the problem: a minimal sin-
gle agent logic of desire and belief and a maximal multi-agent one. The first one is
completely faithful to the framework of possibility theory described in the first two sec-
tions of this paper. Its weighted version is an extension of possibilistic logic, but it has
arguably a limited expressive power. On the other hand, the multi-agent logic GBDLn
is a graded extension of the full-fledged multimodal logic KDn that is very expressive,
but is arguably overexpressive as it contains formulas that can be make hardly intuitive
sense, and its semantics is much richer than the framework of possibility theory. So,
there is a need for more research on the bridge between modal and possibilistic logics.
The logic GBDLn:
– allows for objective formulas while MBDL does not. What is their role and can we
dispense with them?
– allows for introspective formulas of the form N≥α11 N
≥α2
1 ϕ that are not part of the
setting of possibility theory. How to make sense of them?
– presupposes that the epistemic state of an agent depends on the (objective) state this
agent is in, which is not part of the formal framework described in the first sections.
It enables standard techniques in modal logic to be applied, but it is not always easy
to interpret.
More work is needed to come up with an epistemic logic framework which is at the
same time expressive enough for our purpose, and where both semantic and syntactic
aspects remain under control.
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